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This paper analyzes the gradual shift in the technological paradigm of an economy as it approaches 
the world technology frontier. The model developed in this paper consists of firms which employ 
skilled workers as an important input in technological advancement, but the novel feature here is 
the entrepreneur, who is the brain of technological progress. The entrepreneur has to decide to 
undertake either imitative or innovative activities, of which decision both affects and is affected by 
the country’s distance to frontier. Specifically, the entrepreneur needs to have a minimum ability 
threshold level in order to carry out innovation. This endogenous threshold level falls as the 
economy moves closer to the technological frontier, enabling more entrepreneurs to be engaged in 
an innovation-based strategy, and consequently, moving the economy from a technological 
structure that is based on imitation of foreign technologies to one where domestic innovation 
dominates. The transitional dynamics of the model shows that there exists a steady state distance 
from the world frontier that countries will eventually converge to. We also find that it is possible 
for countries under certain conditions, to be trapped in a regime carrying out only imitation of 
world technologies. 
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1.   Introduction 
 
1.1.   Technology trajectory 
A recently published book entitled ‘Imitation to Innovation’ (Kim, 1997) traces how 
Korea’s technological paradigm has evolved from accumulating and assimilation of 
foreign technologies into an advanced industrialized country with indigenous 
technological capabilities to be able to generate American-style innovation as the country 
approaches the technological frontier.1 In a similar vein, Audretsch and Fritsch (2003) 
investigating the cause of West Germany’s structural change find evidence that high-tech 
startups by entrepreneurs are increasingly becoming a more important source of growth 
as the country ushers in the New Economy.  
 In this paper, a simple model is set up to explore the interdependence between a 
country’s stage of development – its distance to frontier, and the internal organization of 
firms in terms of their technological strategy. In particular, the model is one of the 
pioneers in seeking to account for the pattern described above: how an economy 
progresses from a technological structure that is largely characterized by firms that adopt 
foreign technologies to one with a growing share of firms carrying out indigenous 
innovation as it moves towards the world frontier.  
1.2.   Technology the lever of riches 
Since the classic 'Solow residual2' paper (Solow, 1957) which found increased capital 
intensity to account for only 13% of economic progress, economists have come to realize 
that factor accumulation is insufficient to explain economic growth and have instead 
focused on technical progress or total factor productivity (TFP) as the fundamental 
engine of economic growth (see for example, Romer, 1990; Grossman and Helpman, 
1991a; Quah, 2002).  In principle, TFP can encompass many possible interpretations – 
political barriers, monopoly inefficiencies, and so on. However in this paper, the main 
cause of productivity growth will be identified with knowledge creation – ideas for new 
products or production techniques, research and development (R&D), knowledge 
spillovers. Furthermore, following the lead of Romer (1990), technological change will 
not be taken to be exogenously given, to use the metaphor, 'falling from the sky'3, but 
rather an intentional outcome of economic agents in response to profit incentives (i.e., 
endogenous). 
                                                 
1 Japan provides another illustration. The initial strategy for firms in the fifties was to imitate America’s 
superior technology and but they later moved on to raising their own technology level by innovation and 
consequently closing the technology level gap. (Shimomura and Wong, 2001) 
2The residual term refers to any factor that affects growth other than labor and capital inputs, and is often 
ascribed to technical or technological progress. (Scherer, 1999) 
3It has been alternatively explained as discoveries from academic or government labs that are not profit 
motivated. 
  
 
 
1.3.   Twin channels of technological progress 
Technological progress is a result of two main forms of learning, namely innovation and 
imitation (Grossman and Helpman, 1991a). The former consists of the domestic creation 
of new products or processes. While the latter entails importing and implementing 
existing technologies, usually from leading countries abroad through the channels of 
international trade, inward and outward foreign direct investment (FDI), reverse 
engineering of products, etc., (Keller, 2001). 
 One strand of literature has focused on technology diffusion from the world frontier 
as a major source of technical change leading to productivity growth in the developed and 
especially in the developing countries (Keller, 2001). This stems from the discovery by 
Coe, Helpman and Hoffmaister (1997)4, that most developing countries make few 
significant new discoveries for the world market and that a large percentage of the 
world's R&D is concentrated in a small group of industrial countries.  
 This has led to R&D growth models (see for example, Pagageorgiou, 2002b; 
Segerstrom, 1991) including the one developed in this paper, to embody both an 
innovation as well as an imitation term in the economy’s productivity function. 
Furthermore, this paper concurs with Grossman and Helpman (1991b) that effort such as 
the deliberate allocation of resources, which in the model developed here is taken as 
skilled workers, is required in the process of assimilating existing technologies and the 
creating of entirely new ones. Moreover, like Romer (1990), it is assumed, for 
simplification, that only skilled workers and knowledge is used to improve productivity – 
domestic stock of knowledge, in the case of innovation and world stock of ideas, in the 
case of imitation.  
1.4.   Human capital 
Scherer (1999) has advocated that human capital is the most important input in the 
process of advancing technology. Not surprisingly, a growing body of literature has 
addressed the complementarities of human capital and technological progress. One of the 
earliest models developed is by Nelson and Phelps (1966) which suggested that the level 
of education speeds up technological diffusion. Their simple illustration was that of an 
educated farmer possessing ability to discern profitable ideas and thus adopting new 
processes or products more quickly than his uneducated counterpart.  
 Benhabib and Spiegel (2002), using cross country data obtain results consistent to 
Nelson and Phelps’ hypothesis and extends the role of human capital to be an engine of 
domestic innovation besides being a facilitator of technology adoption. A paper by 
Kneller (2005) also lends empirical support that a country's absorptive capacity of 
international technology is dependent on human capital and domestic R&D.  Similarly, 
Xu (2000, see also Blomstrom, Kokko and Zejan [1998]) finds that less developed 
countries unlike the advanced countries did not benefit from technology transfer by US 
multinational corporations (MNEs) because of insufficient human capital to absorb 
technology diffused. This emphasizes the view that the extraction of technological 
                                                 
4 Cited in Papageprgiou, 2002b. 
  
 
 
knowledge and utilizing it domestically is more successful when recipient nations have 
technically trained workers. 
 This paper, following the spirit of Mayer (2001) and Papageorgiou (2002a), holds to 
the view that human capital5 is significant to a country's productivity growth as a 
determinant of its capacity to carry out innovation as well as to adopt and implement 
imported technology. This is distinct from the human-capital-augmented Solow model 
where human capital is treated as an input into the production process (Mayer, 2001).  
 However, the model developed here distinguishes from the above mentioned studies, 
in introducing the entrepreneur as the lead actor in spearheading technological activities. 
1.5.   The entrepreneur 
Although entrepreneurship has generally been viewed as important for economic growth 
and technological advancement, most economic literature has downplayed its role, due 
partly to the difficulty of fitting the entrepreneur into the theory of the firm (Baumol, 
1968). One paper that does look at the phenomenon of entrepreneurship is by Schmitz 
(1989), who presents a model in which entrepreneurship is a crucial factor of economic 
growth through its singular role in the imitation of existing technologies. In his paper, the 
diffusion of new knowledge is not a costless process but requires the work of an 
entrepreneur.  
 Another piece of work that has the entrepreneur as its main feature is Schumpeter’s 
famous Theory of Economic Development (1934)6. The book introduces two main 
notions, firstly, innovation was the engine of economic development and secondly, that 
entrepreneurial activity was the source of that innovation. He also defined the 
entrepreneur as the ‘founder of a new firm and as an innovator’. 
These two R&D tasks are combined to be undertaken by the entrepreneur in our model, 
who is revived as the ‘apex of the hierarchy that determines the behavior of the 
(intermediate) firm’ (Baumol, 1968) deciding on whether to conduct indigenous 
innovation or adopt from the world frontier in order to improve productivity. The 
entrepreneur’s decision is based on the relative rewards obtained from taking up either 
one of the R&D activities which in turn is dependent on the specific ability of the 
entrepreneur. This skill could comprise of the entrepreneurs’ motivation, insight, 
tolerance of uncertainty, creative capacity, etc. Furthermore, the level of entrepreneur 
ability has a positive impact on the creation of new knowledge but not on imitation. 
Consequently, the higher the entrepreneurial skill, the more likely the firm would engage 
in innovation.  
 This idea bears some resemblance to the manager in Acemoglu, D., Aghion, P., and 
Zilibotti (2002a) who performs the tasks of innovation and adoption where skills are 
more important for the former activity. However, in their paper, the skill level takes on 
only two values to correspond to either a high or low-skill manager. Hence there is a 
corner to corner switch in the economy from an imitation-based to innovated-based 
                                                 
5 In the model developed later, the term human capital is replaced with skilled workers. This is not incorrect 
as we assume there is only one type of workers in the economy, namely, skilled workers. 
6 Cited in Scherer (1999) 
  
 
 
equilibrium. We depart from their paper by allowing the ability to be distributed 
uniformly across the entrepreneurs. As a consequence, at each period, the economy 
consists of a range of firms undertaking imitation and innovation, with the specific firm 
embarking on either one of the R&D activities depending on the capability of the 
entrepreneur heading it. 
 The argument here that entrepreneurial skill is required for technological progress 
does not mean that all new products or processes in the market originate from 
entrepreneurs. A fair amount of innovative activity is carried out in government research 
labs and large corporations. The premise however, is that entrepreneurship plays an 
essential role in the creation of new knowledge. The world has much to thank for the 
innovative contributions of Bill Gates, Peter Drucker, Akio Morita and the like. 
1.6.   Distance to frontier 
This paper draws on work by Acemoglu, D., Aghion, P., and Zilibotti (2002a) and 
(2002b) in their study of the relationship between a country’s distance to the 
technological frontier and the internal organization of the firm. In the earlier paper, they 
show how an economy switches from an investment-based strategy to an innovation-
based strategy with greater selection of firms and managers as it catches up with the 
frontier. The latter paper explores the trade-off faced by firms between vertically 
integrating versus outsourcing production which is again dependent on the distance to 
frontier. 
This framework on the other hand, explores another pertinent firm choice: engaging 
in imitation of foreign technologies or home-grown innovation. This production decision 
both affects and is affected by the economy’s distance to the world technology frontier. 
Furthermore, the entrepreneurs take a centre stage in the economy as the key decision 
maker. These entrepreneurs are endowed with certain talents that contribute to the 
success of innovative but not imitative activities, as adoption is considered to be 
relatively easier than innovation. In order for innovation to become more profitable than 
adoption, there is a minimum threshold level of skill that the entrepreneur must have.  
The results of the model reveal that this endogenous threshold level of skill falls as 
the economy approaches the world frontier. Hence predicting the technological paradigm 
shift in the economy from one based on imitation of existing technologies to one where 
domestic innovation dominates as technology in the country advances. This is consistent 
with the general view that the relative importance of international sources of technology 
for a country’s productivity growth decreases in the level of development of the country. 
(Keller, 2001).  
This idea of a threshold entrepreneur skill is reminiscent of a study by Howitt and 
Mayer-Foulkes (2002) in which a country needs to surpass a minimum level of human 
capital in order to graduate from an adoption steady-state to an innovation steady-state, 
which level depends on the technological frontier. The model in this paper however is 
more realistic in that it allows for both innovation and adoption activities to take place 
within the same country. 
  
 
 
This theory also casts light on Singapore's own experience. Historically, Singapore's 
spectacular growth since its independence in 1965 has been accompanied by continuous 
industrial structural changes. The initial strategy was to attract foreign direct investment 
(FDI) to locate their labor intensive parts of production in Singapore which would both 
provide needed employment and fuel export-oriented growth. In the subsequent decades, 
there was a transition to a higher quality ladder in manufacturing production and 
developing of the service sector.  
 The heart of this paper, which lies in the transition in the engine of technological 
progress from imitation to innovation, is akin to how Singapore is transforming its 
technological paradigm from one where progress stems largely from assimilating foreign 
technologies brought to its shore by foreign investors to the present gradual building up 
of its indigenous innovative capacity. Traditionally, Singapore’s figures for the number 
of patents and royalties7 as well as researchers have been relatively low. However, in 
recent years, as the country moves closer to the world technology frontier, a few private 
domestically-owned firms, such as Creative Technology and Aztec Systems have 
emerged and the level of patenting activities have also increased (Blomstrom, Kokko and 
Sjoholm, 1998). Furthermore, a research study by Bloch & Tang (2000) using an 
integrated dual cost approach finds evidence indicating that human capital is one of the 
main contributors of Singapore's technical progress8. This provides some support to our 
model’s assumption that skilled workers are essential for a country’s absorbing of foreign 
technologies and developing of new knowledge. 
1.7.   Structure of the paper 
The plan of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section two presents the basic model. Of 
particular interest is the distance to frontier function. Section three investigates the 
transitional dynamic properties of the model and how the country’s distance to frontier 
evolves. In Section four, the primary findings of the model and implications for policy-
makers are analyzed and discussed. Finally, Section five concludes the paper. 
2.   The Basic Model 
2.1.   Economic agents 
Following Acemoglu, D., Aghion, P., and Zilibotti (2002b), entrepreneurs with a mass of 
unity are endowed with entrepreneurial skills and are owners of the intermediate firms in 
the economy. The entrepreneurs are profit maximizing and have the option either to adopt 
foreign technology or carry out domestic innovation as its technology production method. 
Furthermore, to keep the analysis simple and highlight the effects of interest, it is 
assumed that there are a fixed number of skilled workers, who supply their labor to the 
entrepreneurs and are equally productive in both types of R&D activity. 
 
                                                 
7 The number of patents and royalties typically reflect the stock of indigenously created technology 
(Blomstrom, Kokko, & Zejan, 1998) 
8 The other important determinant of technical progress was industry-specific R&D. 
  
 
 
2.2.   Final-good sector 
The final good is produced competitively by using a continuum 1 of intermediate goods 
inputs, according to: 
 ( ) υαυυα dtxtAty ∫= 10 )()(1 .  (1) 
where At(υ) is a productivity parameter which reflects the quality of intermediate input υ 
at time t and will be specified later. xt(υ) denotes the amount of intermediate goods used 
by the final good sector and is additive separable in nature9. 
 The final-good producer is competitive and maximizes her instantaneous profits 
 υυυπ dxPy tttFt ∫−= 10 )()(  . (2) 
where the final good is taken as the numeraire and  Pt(υ) is the price of the intermediate 
good. 
2.3.   Intermediate-good sector 
The intermediate goods sector consists of monopolistic producers or entrepreneurs of a 
variety of goods. Monopoly profits are required for entrepreneurs of intermediate goods 
to cover the production costs plus the costs of R&D activity (either imitation or 
innovation). It is assumed that the entrepreneur υ retains a perpetual monopoly of 
supplying good υ for production and that productivity improvement takes place within 
the firm as opposed to buying from an R&D sector. 
 Using Eq. (2), the intermediate firms face the demand schedule from final-good 
producers 
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As in Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti (2002a), the monopoly producer faces fringe 
competition that forces her to charge a limit price: 
 χυ =)(tP  .  (4) 
where χ is the marginal costs of the fringe firm. We set χ > 1 to imply that the 
entrepreneur, who uses only one unit of final good to produce one unit of the intermediate 
good, is more productive. While χ < 1/α indicates that that their productivity gap is small 
enough such that the entrepreneur is compelled to charge a limit price to deter entry by 
the fringe. The parameter χ is a measure of the degree of competition in the market. 
The equilibrium monopoly profits can then be obtained using Eqs. (3) and (4) 
as:  
 ( ) )()()( 1 υυδυπ αα ttt HwA −= − .  (5) 
                                                 
9 This implies that the invention of new ideas does not make obsolete existing ones and that each intermediate 
good is of use independent of whether other intermediate goods are used. (Papageorgiou, 2002a) 
  
 
 
where αχχδ −
−
−≡ 1
1
))(1(  and δ is monotonically increasing in χ. A higher δ or χ 
corresponds to lesser competition and higher monopoly profits which may be a 
consequence of factors such as government regulation. Ht(υ) is the total amount of skilled 
workers used in producing intermediate goods in sector υ and wt is the skilled worker 
wage rate that is assumed to be given. Together, they represent the only variable costs to 
the firm. 
 The monopoly profits are taken to be the wage or reward of the entrepreneur and are 
proportional to its productivity parameter At(υ). In addition, the entrepreneur has to 
decide between two types of R&D activity: indigenous innovation or adoption from 
frontier technology. 
2.3.1.   Innovative firms 
The productivity of intermediate good υ of the entrepreneur that chooses to innovate is 
expressed as: 
 1)()()( −= tIttt ABHqA υυυ .  (6) 
where qt(υ) denotes the level of entrepreneurial ability that is uniformly distributed from 
[0,1] and )(υItH  is the level of skilled workers employed for the innovative activity. The 
inclusion of the skilled worker term in the productivity equation is in accordance to 
reality, where technological advances are normally engineered by highly educated 
individuals. (Grossman and Helpman, 1991b)  
 Entrepreneurial ability qt(υ)  augments the effectiveness of the skilled worker 
engaged in research and is required for innovative but not imitative activities. The term 
qt(υ)  can also be viewed as the probability that an innovation is successful while the 
parameter B  can be interpreted as the 'step size' of innovation to boost its effectiveness, 
where 1>B .  
 At-1 denotes the average stock of domestic knowledge in the economy in period t-1 
that researchers build on for new innovations. This implies that technological spillovers 
exist since innovations made in each sector contribute to the expansion of a pool of 
knowledge that is freely accessible to all sectors in the following period to facilitate 
further innovations. This makes use of the characteristic of knowledge as a nonrival and 
partially excludable input10. Hence, growth in domestic knowledge enhances the 
productivity of skilled workers in innovation in the next period. 
 Eq. (6) states that, the productivity of domestic innovation is positively dependent on 
the interaction of both the skilled worker and a country's stock of knowledge11. Therefore, 
a scientist holding a PhD doing research in the U.S would be more productive than a 
high-school graduate doing the same R&D activity in Ethiopia. 
                                                 
10  The former implies that a design once created can be used many times over again. The latter refers to the 
fact that an inventor has property rights over a design for production  (excludable) but no control over  its use 
for research by others (non-excludable) (Romer, 1990). 
11The stock of knowledge is typically proportional to the number of domestically known product designs 
(Keller, 2001). 
  
 
 
The monopoly profits of the entrepreneur that innovates can be derived simply from 
substituting Eq. (6), the productivity function, into Eq. (5).  
 ( ) )()()()( 11 υυυδυπ αα ItttIttII HwABHq −= −− .  (7) 
where δI is a measure of the degree of competition among the firms that innovate. The 
representative entrepreneur then chooses the profit maximizing level of skilled workers to 
employ by taking the derivative with respect to )(υItH  and setting it equal to zero. The 
optimum )(υItH  is 
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where it is assumed that α < 0.5. To see why this condition is set, if α > 0.5, this would 
mean that as the wage rate increases, the firm demands more workers, which is 
counterintuitive. Substituting Eq. (8) back into Eq. (7) yields the explicit profit function 
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In this equation, it can be seen that the surplus for the entrepreneur that innovates is 
positively related to the stock of knowledge in the domestic economy. Note that in order 
for profits to be positive, α < 0.5, and this has been ensured by the earlier assumption.  
2.3.2.   Imitative firm 
On the other hand, the productivity of intermediate good υ of the entrepreneur that adopts 
technology is given as 
 1)()( −= tAtt AHA υυ  .  (10) 
where )(υAtH  is the level of skilled workers employed in imitative activity and 
1−tA denotes the body of world knowledge in the previous period. According to the above 
equation, the process of imitation is not a passive and costless activity, but skilled 
workers must be devoted to the activity to exploit the benefits of world technology.  
 The profits of the entrepreneur who imitates can be similarly expressed by 
substituting Eq. (10) into the profit schedule of Eq. (5) 
 ( ) )()()( 11 υυδυπ αα AtttAtAAt HwAH −= −− .  (11) 
where δA measures the degree of competition among firms that adopt foreign 
technologies. Solving for the optimum )(υAtH  employed gives 
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The corresponding explicit profit function can be obtained by substituting Eq. (12) into 
(11)  
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From Eq. (13), it can be noted that the profit function of the imitative firm is dependent 
on the stock of world technologies.  
2.4.   Threshold level of ability  
This section analyzes the entrepreneur's decision on whether to carry out imitation or 
innovation and predicts the underlying industrial organization at each date, that is, the 
fraction of firms engaging in adoption frontier technologies and those undertaking 
innovative activities. This is done by solving for the endogenous threshold 
entrepreneurial skill level, q*, which we find to be a function of the economy’s distance 
to frontier. 
Setting )()( υπυπ ItAt =  from Eq.s (9) and (13) yields the critical threshold level of 
entrepreneur ability12 
 
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
−
−
− 1,min
1
1
1* α
α
δ
δ
I
A
t
t
BA
A
q .  (14) 
Furthermore, we define  
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where at-1 is an (inverse) measure of the country's distance to frontier with at-1  increasing 
in size as the country approaches the world technology frontier. It is also assumed that all 
country’s have a state of technology that is at least less than the world frontier, hence 
11 −− ≤ tt AA  or similarly, at-1 ≤ 1 
 Eq. (14) can then be rewritten as: 
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A few things can be noted about Eq. (16). Firstly, there exists a unique q* such that 
entrepreneurs with ability level qt(υ) ≤ q* will find it more profitable to choose to imitate 
                                                 
12An arbitrage condition is that in equilibrium, a skilled worker employed in innovation or imitation receives 
the same wage. 
  
 
 
while those with qt(υ) > q* will decide to engage in innovation. Secondly, q* is limited by 
the value 1 to correspond to the entrepreneurial ability, qt(υ)~ U(0,1). When q* = 1, this 
means that all entrepreneurs find it profit-maximizing to choose to undertake adoption. 
On the other hand, when 0 < q* < 1, the entrepreneurs will decide to imitate or innovate 
depending on their individual capability, qt(υ). In addition, there is a threshold level of 
distance to frontier is given by  
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whereby countries at a distance further from the frontier than *a  will have an 
entrepreneurial threshold ability q* = 1. To illustrate with an example, a country like 
Burma, that is far away from the world technology frontier, such that at-1 ≤ a*, will carry 
out only imitation of foreign technology but no indigenous innovation. Beyond this 
threshold, the economy will consist of a mixture of firms that opt for either an 
innovation-based strategy or imitation-based strategy to improve productivity, depending 
on the entrepreneur’s skill level.  
 It can be easily deduced from Eq. (17) that a higher B  or δI/δA will result in a smaller 
a*. To summarize, 
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From Eq. (16), we formalize how the distance to frontier affects a country’s technological 
paradigm at each period: as the economy approaches the world technology frontier, at-1  
increases, and thus q*  decreases. This tilts the balance towards entrepreneur choices that 
favor innovation over imitation. In other words, as a country gets close to the 
technological frontier, the proportion of firms carrying out innovative activities relative to 
firms that adopt from established technologies will rise.  
 Another observation that be made is that when monopoly power is higher for the 
innovating entrepreneur as compared to the entrepreneur that imitates, the threshold q* is 
lowered and innovation is preferred. The reason is that where monopoly power is higher, 
the entrepreneur will be more likely to employ that particular technological production 
method since there are higher profits to be reaped, ceteris paribus. This is consistent with 
the Schumpeterian hypothesis that monopoly rent induces R&D. Lastly, the unique q* is 
inversely related to the ‘step size’ that boosts innovation productivity. Intuitively, holding 
other things constant, factors that facilitate innovation favors that production method and 
lowers the minimum threshold entrepreneur ability for profitably engaging in innovation. 
 Figure 1 depicts the profit function with respect to the entrepreneur skill level qt for 
the imitating and innovating firm, labeled πA and πI respectively. The function πA is a 
horizontal straight line since the profits of the imitating firm is independent of q, 
according to Eq. (13). The function πI, on the other hand is increasing in q, consistent 
with Eq. (9). The minimum threshold entrepreneurial ability level can be found from the 
Both innovation and adoption occurs 
Only adoption occurs 
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intersection of the two profit functions as indicated by q* in the diagram. As mentioned 
above, entrepreneurs with capability level qt(υ) ≤ q* will opt to imitate while those with 
qt(υ) > q*  will engage in innovation. Therefore, Figure 1 also reveals the share of firms 
that adopt foreign technologies as q*, while firms that carry out indigenous innovation as 
(1 - q*). 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Profits of adopting and innovating firm. 
 
 
 Now suppose that at-1 increases, for example, if At-1 rises holding      constant. From 
Eq. (9) it is clear that πI function would shift up and as a result, the critical ability 
threshold moves from *0q  to *1q . At a lower q*, more entrepreneurs will find it optimal to 
switch from imitation to innovation to improve firm productivity. Hence this clearly 
shows how the distance to world frontier affects the technological structure of a country. 
Specifically, as an economy moves closer to the frontier, the technological paradigm 
gradually shifts away from adoption of world technologies towards indigenous 
innovation. 
2.5.   Labor market equilibrium 
At time t, total skilled workers in the economy is allocated in R&D activity between 
innovation and imitation for the case where 0 < q* < 1. If we sum across all skilled 
workers engaged in R&D, the total human capital is given by: 
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By substituting Eq.s (12), (8), (16) and (15) inside, this can be written as: 
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(19) 
As the economy approaches the frontier, q* decreases and more firms choose to engage in 
innovation. This result in a decrease in the proportion of skilled workers demanded for 
imitation and a subsequent rise in the skilled workers employed for innovation. 
From Eq. (19), the equilibrium wage rate of skilled workers, wt can then be derived 
easily to be 
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(20) 
In the situation of a technologically backward country when q* = 1, skilled workers are 
only employed in adopting technology. This is given by 
 dqqHH
q A
t∫= *0 )( .  (21) 
Substituting Eq.s (12) and (16) into (21) gives 
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The equilibrium wage rate of skilled labor in the technologically backward economy that 
is engaged in only adoption can be similarly derived as 
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This is lower than the wage rate in Eq. (20) for the economy nearer the frontier (at-1 > a*) 
that engages in both adoption of foreign technologies and home-grown innovation 
activities. This implies that identically productive skilled workers in the country that is 
more technologically advanced will enjoy a higher wage than the country whose distance 
to frontier falls below the threshold a*. 
2.6.   Technological progress 
Finally, the average productivity of the economy that consists of a mixture of firms that 
carries out adoption or innovation at time t, At-1, is specified as 
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where the productivity level is summed across all intermediate goods. Again by 
substituting Eq.s (12), (8), (16) and (15) inside we have,  
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(25) 
Inspection of the above expressions reveals several things. Firstly, it can be seen from 
Eq. (24) that productivity growth in the country is captured by the two dimensions of 
innovation and adoption. Secondly, Eq. (25) shows that when a country progresses nearer 
to the world technology frontier, at-1 increases, the contribution of imitative activities to 
the advancement of technology in the economy decreases and domestic innovation takes 
over as the major source of technological progress. To put it differently, a technologically 
backward country will raise productivity level mainly by adopting advanced technologies 
while one closer the world frontier will depend more on the channel of innovation. 
Furthermore, the size of the ‘step size’ innovation, B, also determines the weight of the 
imitative and innovative activities for a given at-1, where a higher B causes innovation to 
play a more important role in advancing the country’s technology. 
 Next, wt is endogenized from Eq. (20) and substituted into Eq. (25) 
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For the situation when q* = 1, where firms carries out only adoption of frontier 
technology to improve productivity, the average productivity of the economy is 
 dqqHAA
q A
ttt ∫ −= *0 1 )( , for *q  = 1.  (27) 
After substituting Eq. (12) and (16), we have 
 ( ) ( )
( )
α
α
α
α
δ
δ
α
αδ αα
−
−
−
−
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−=
−
− 1
1
1
21 1
1
21
1
I
A
t
t
t
A
t Ba
A
w
A .  (28) 
 Finally, we once more endogenize wt by substituting Eq. (23) the equilibrium wage 
rate of skilled workers that imitate technologies, to obtain 
 1−= tt AHA .  (29) 
Not surprisingly, Eq. (29) can also be obtained by aggregating the productivity function 
of the firm that adopts technology in Eq. (10) since the economy’s productivity level 
depends only on one type of R&D activity, namely, imitation. 
 Furthermore, we define the growth rate of world technology frontier, tA , by g 
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which enables us to rewrite Eq.s (25) and (29) as 
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(31) 
Eq. (31) gives us the equilibrium law of motion of at. It states that the growth of country 
that is far off from the world frontier and only carries out adoption of existing 
technologies (i.e., at-1 ≤ a* ) depends only on the level of skilled workers. However, once 
the technological gap is sufficiently small, so that at-1 > a*, the economy will consists of a 
mixture of imitating and innovating firms and growth will be affected by the stock of 
skilled workers, as well as the parameters B, δI/δA, a0 and α. 
3.   Transitional Dynamics 
3.1.   Baseline simulation 
In this section, the transitional dynamics implied by the equilibrium law of motion of at, 
Eq. (31), is investigated by means of a simulation exercise. The results show that 
technologically backward countries can potentially narrow their distance to the world 
frontier and eventually converge to a steady state aSS, higher than when it started. As 
implied by the model, this convergence is done through the channels of only adoption 
when at-1 ≤ a* and both imitation and innovation for at-1 > a*. The long run equilibrium 
steady state is found to be below that of the world technology frontier, in other words, 
there is no final convergence to the frontier. Therefore, advanced countries whose 
technological gap is initially smaller than the steady state, at-1 > a*, will converge in the 
long run to the lower aSS, further from the world frontier. Furthermore, under certain 
conditions, it is possible that the economy’s steady state aSS remains less than or equal to 
a* and productivity growth is based solely on the adoption of world technologies.  We 
term this situation an adoption trap. 
Parameters used in the baseline simulation are given in Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
if at-1 ≤ a* 
 
 
if at-1 > a* 
  
 
 
Table 1.  Parameter values for baseline simulation. 
a0 0.10 H  0.13 
α 0.4 B 10 
g 0.02 δI/δA 1 
 
The world technological frontier is assumed to be exogenous and growing at a value of 
0.02 to approximately match the average per capita growth rate of the United States of 
America (U.S.A). The country is assumed to be technologically backward and therefore, 
the baseline initial distance to  frontier is set as a0 = 0.1. Consistent with α < 0.5 in the 
earlier condition from Eq. (8), we impose α = 0.4 assign values for H , B and δI/δA to 
ensure that the assumption at ≤ 1 is satisfied. 
 The continued line in Figure 2 illustrates the transitional path for the country’s 
distance to frontier, at, resulting from the baseline simulation exercise. As mentioned 
earlier, firms in countries with technology level a0 ≤ a* start out by carrying out only 
imitation of established technologies, as is the case for our benchmark country, a0 = a*. In 
the following period however, the technological gap is reduced, at > a* and hence, 
technological progress becomes a result of both adoption and innovation with the latter 
increasing in contribution as the distance to frontier narrows. It can be observed that at 
finally converges to a higher steady state, a0 < aSS< 1. This implies that the technology 
gap will not be closed fully in the long run and the world frontier’s technology continues 
to be more advanced than the domestic technology.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Transitional distance to frontier path. 
 
 It is also possible for an economy to be trapped in the adoption-based technological 
paradigm with its technological gap at continually less than or equal to a*. The 
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transitional path of at for such an economy that is in an adoption trap is illustrated by the 
discontinued line in Figure 2. In the next period, the economy moves to the steady state 
aSS that corresponds to  H /(1+g)13 and growth in the country depends only on the level of 
skilled workers which is exogenously fixed in this model. 
3.2.   Evolution of at 
The Eq. (31) implicitly expresses at as a function of at-1, therefore, we can use it to check 
in this section if equilibrium value(s) of at exists. Taking the earlier baseline parameters, 
Figure 3 illustrates at as a function of at-1 and shows how it crosses the 45-degree line at a 
single point where at = at-1. This denotes a unique and globally stable equilibrium aSS or 
to put it simply, whatever the initial value of at is, it will converge gradually to aSS. In 
other words, holding other things equal, countries of differing relative productivities will 
converge to a common distance to frontier aSS.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Transitional distance to frontier path. 
 
 
 The parameters can also be varied to obtain multiple equilibrium values of at. This 
occurs if H 14, B and δI/δA are set too high and produces both a stable and an unstable 
equilibrium. However, we will only focus on the case with one unique and stable steady 
state. 
 One interesting feature that is observed below is that the at function is constant for all 
at-1 ≤ a*(=0.10). This means that other things being equal, countries with an initial 
technological gap less than or equal to 0.10 will catch up to the same distance to frontier 
in the next period, a1. The reason is that the productivity of adopting foreign technologies 
depends on the stock of world knowledge which is equally accessible to all15, and not on 
                                                 
13 According to Eq. (31) 
14 For instance if we set H  > 0.13623113. 
15 We do not investigate the existence of barriers to technology dissemination in this paper. See Parente and 
Prescott (1994) for a discussion on this. 
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the domestic productivity. A second implication that is captured here is that countries that 
begin by solely carrying out imitation can potentially catch up quickly to a position 
sufficiently close to the frontier which allows for both imitation and innovation activities 
to profitably take place in the country. 
3.3.   Sensitivity analysis 
It is interesting in the analysis to determine the transitional paths of countries that have 
different market structures, level of skilled workers, step-size innovation and distance to 
frontier. To do this, changes on the parameters H , B, δI/δA and a0 are made and 
illustrated in the following figures. Sensitivity analysis of these parameters also enables 
one to better understand the properties of the at equation and reveal some further insights. 
3.3.1.   Exogenous increase in δI/δA 
In Figure 4, an increase in the monopoly power among the firms that pursue an 
innovative-based strategy relative to firms that are adopting, δI/δA 16, shifts the whole 
transitional path upward and leads to a higher steady state aSS. This seems to suggests that 
an economy where there are greater monopoly rents to be gained for the entrepreneur that 
produces through innovation will settle at a long-run productivity level closer to the 
world frontier compared to one where there is greater monopoly power among firms that 
engage in adoption.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Sensitivity analysis of δI/δA. 
 
 
 However, it was found that for values of δI/δA > 1.2667, the economy actually 
converges to a lower steady state aSS. One possible explanation for the results is that as 
δI/δA grows larger, this pushes up the profits for firms that innovate relative to adopt 
                                                 
16 Recall that  αχχδ −
−
−≡ 1
1
))(1(  , where χ is a measure of the degree of competition in the market.  
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technology. Correspondingly, more entrepreneurs decide to engage in innovation because 
their ability level exceeds the threshold. However, the entrepreneurs at the lower end of 
the ability spectrum are not as efficient in innovation and this leads to an inferior long-
run growth rate. As this is more clearly shown in the next chapter, we leave further 
elaboration and the policy implications till later.  
3.3.2.   Exogenous increase in H  
Figure 5 reveals that the size of the skilled labor force is vital in determining the 
productivity level of a country. A higher level of skilled workers increases an economy’s 
capacity to carry out adoption of technology and indigenous innovation and 
unambiguously leads to a smaller steady state technology gap from the world frontier.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Sensitivity analysis of H . 
 
3.3.3.   Exogenous increase in B 
Figure 6 shows how a change in the step-size innovation B affects the transitional path of 
the distance to frontier. The findings inform us that, everything else being equal, the 
larger the B the higher the steady state aSS. The intuition for this result is that a larger B 
parameter leads to a larger boost on the effect that innovation has on productivity for the 
firms that engage in this type of R&D activity and hence a higher overall productivity for 
the economy. 
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Fig. 6. Sensitivity analysis of B 
 
3.3.4.   Exogenous increase in a0 
Finally, Figure 7 reveals that holding other things constant, a decrease in the distance to 
frontier will lead to a faster convergence to the steady-state. Increasing a0 from 0.10 to 
0.12 shifts the transitional dynamic path of at to the left, affecting the transitional growth 
but not the long-run growth rate. This suggests that countries nearer to the world 
technological frontier will experience a higher growth in the transition period compared 
to countries that are more backward. This is similar to the notion of “contiguous 
knowledge” (Papegeorgiou, 2000a) which holds to the view that countries that are closer 
to the frontier are better able to take advantage of new technologies than those more 
backward and contrary to the idea that a country’s rate of catching up is a positive 
function of its relative backwardness.  
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Fig. 7. Sensitivity analysis of a0 
 
3.4.   Summary 
To summarize the results, our simulation analysis reveals that H  and B has a positive 
influence on lowering the long-run steady state distance to frontier of a country, aSS ; δI/δA 
has a positive impact on aSS for δI/δA ≤ 1.2667 and an adverse effect thereafter; while a0, 
the initial technological gap, affects the economy’s process of technological convergence 
but not the long-run growth.  
4.   Discussion of the Model 
A central question that naturally arises from the model is how can countries reduce their 
long-run distance to frontier or equivalently, obtain a higher steady state, aSS. However 
before attempting to answer the question, we summarize relevant insights that have been 
established and interpretations which would assist in understanding the analysis in the 
subsequent sections. 
 
(1) There is a threshold distance to frontier, a*, whereby countries surpassing it will 
switch from a solely adoption-based regime to an adoption-and-innovation-based 
technological structure. According to Eq. (17) and holding other things equal, the 
switch will occur earlier for an economy that has a higher δI/δA or B. Intuitively, 
policies that bring about potentially higher monopoly rents for firms that innovate 
and a larger step size boost to innovation, makes being in an adoption trap less likely. 
(2) For an economy with a mixture of imitating and innovating firms, the transition 
mechanism from adoption towards indigenous innovation is portrayed through a 
minimum endogenous entrepreneurial level of capability q*, that the entrepreneur 
must possess before innovation becomes more profitable than imitation. This critical 
value, which gives the fraction of firms that adopt technologies, is decreasing in at-1, 
δI/δA and B17 from Eq. (16). In other words, increasing these factors tilts the balance 
towards entrepreneurs innovating. 
(3) For some parameter values, an economy can be stuck in a steady state in which the 
technological paradigm only adopts established technologies but does not carry out 
domestic innovation. The long run growth will then be limited to depending on the 
size of the skilled labor force, as seen from Eq. (31) where aSS =  H /(1+g) ≤ a* 
(4) If the economy’s steady state is aSS > a*, then consistent with Eq. (31) and the 
simulation findings, the long run growth is positively affected by H , B and a certain 
range  of  δI/δA. 
(5) The results of the model show that it is the relative competitive structures of the 
intermediate firms that innovate over those that imitate, δI/δA, rather than the absolute 
monopoly power that has a bearing on the technological gap, at. 
                                                 
17 The intuition behind this has been discussed in Section 2.4 and is therefore not repeated here. 
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(6) Finally, the parameter B is open to several interpretations such as the availability of 
knowledge institutions, openness in knowledge flows and other policies that facilitate 
the innovation process and increase its probability of success.  
 
 In the following sections, we study strategy(s) to move closer to the world frontier for 
countries in two different scenarios:  
(i) a country that is initially at a steady state with only adoption   
(ii) one which both adopts and innovates at its steady state. 
 The comparative static analyses consist in examining the effect on the steady state aSS 
by exogenously increasing the parameters H , B and δI/δA. 
4.1.   Case I: Steady state with only adoption 
Table 2 shows the parameter values chosen for the benchmark country that is trapped in a 
solely adopting steady state.  
Table 2.  Parameter values for benchmark country that only adopts. 
a0 0.10 H  0.08 
α 0.4 B 8 
g 0.02 δI/δA 0.8 
 
 The values for the right column are deliberately set sufficiently low so that the 
economy’s aSS is less than a*. This implies that whatever the country’s initial 
technological gap, it will finally converge to a technological paradigm that only imitates.  
 This is clearly depicted in Figures 8 - 10 in which the continuous line intersects the 
45-degree line at its horizontal section. As explained under Section 3.2, this is because 
when there are only adopting firms, the economy’s productivity is independent of its 
initial at  and relies on the world’s frontier, At.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 8. Impact of aSS – increase in δI/δA. 
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Fig. 9. Impact of aSS – increase in B. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 10. Impact of aSS – increase in H . 
 
Some other things to note is firstly, the y-axis and x-axis for the following diagrams have 
again been scaled down without losing other relevant information as the steady state is 
unique (i.e., it crosses the 45-degree line only once), this is done so that changes that 
occur are more obvious. Secondly, there exist certain thresholds of H and B sufficiently 
large for the economy to switch out of the adoption trap. However, in this section it is 
*
0
*
1 aa   
ass 
at 
at-1 
 B =10 
ssa1  
ssa0
at 
at-1 
 H  =0.10 
a*  
  
 
 
assumed that changes in the parameters made do not bring the country out of the solely 
adopting regime. This is done in order to analyze the optimal policy to implement for a 
country whose aSS remains less than a*. This brings us to the last point: comparison of 
optimal choices of H , B and δI/δA are discussed in our analysis although neither the role 
of the government nor the opportunity cost to a country to change these parameters is 
formally introduced in the model, which are left as an area for future research. 
Figure 8 and Figure 9 reveal that an increase in δI/δA or in B results in a fall in the 
critical threshold, a0*  that determines an economy’s switch from an adoption trap to both 
adoption and innovation (a0*  to a1* ). However, the change in the parameters is not 
sufficiently large and consequently the country’s long-run steady state aSS  is not affected. 
The firms continue to remain doing only imitation of technologies with aSS < a*. 
 On the other hand, Figure 10 shows that a rise in H  brings the economy to a higher 
steady state aSS while the critical threshold a* is unchanged. This holds true even when 
the increase in H  is not particularly large and the country remains in the adoption trap. It 
can be noted that the graphical analysis behaves according to the Eq.s (31) and (17) of aSS 
and a* respectively. 
 In light of our findings, we can conclude that the optimal strategy for countries that 
are far off from the frontier and whose firms only engage in imitation is to enlarge H . 
The intuition lies in the fact that absorption of technologies from abroad relies only on 
the stock of skilled workers and the world knowledge and therefore policies that facilitate 
innovation (increase in δI/δA or B) do not affect the long run distance to frontier.  
4.2.   Case II: Steady State with both adoption and innovation 
Table 3 shows the parameter values chosen for the benchmark country that is in 
equilibrium with a mixture of firms either imitating or innovating. 
Table 3.  Parameter values for benchmark country that adopts and innovates. 
a0 0.10 H  0.12 
α 0.4 B 10 
g 0.02 δI/δA 1 
 
 
 Again, the values for the right column are deliberately set high enough such that the 
economy’s aSS is greater than a* and the economy will finally converge to a technological 
paradigm where there is a mixture of firms either imitating or innovating.  This can be 
seen from Figures 11 - 13 where the sloping part of the continuous line intersects the 45-
degree line once. The threshold a* has not been marked out in the following figures as it 
does not have any policy implications in this section and to avoid complicating the 
diagrams but we can expect the rise in B and δI/δA to lower a* while changing H  has no 
effect on a*. 
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Fig.11. Impact of aSS – increase in B. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 12. Impact of aSS – increase in H . 
 
Figures 11 and 12 illustrate how an increase in B and H  affects the benchmark 
economy’s steady state distance to frontier, moving from a0SS to a1SS. The figures 
demonstrate that raising either parameter enables the economy to achieve a smaller long-
run distance to frontier.  
 We have deliberately left the analysis of an increase in δI/δA as the last comparative 
static due to its unusual effect on the evolution of at as depicted in Figure 1318.  
                                                 
18 The qualitative results are the same for any δI/δA > 1.062. 
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Fig. 13. Impact of aSS – increase in δI/δA. 
 
The dynamics of at is as follows: 
(i) where the discontinued line departs from the horizontal portion describes how a* is 
reduced due to a higher δI/δA and the economy would emerge from a solely adopting 
regime to one with both types of R&D activities at a lower threshold technology 
level.  
(ii) the downward sloping discontinued line implies that at is decreasing in at-1. The line 
then reaches a minimum before at increases in at-1 as per normal. 
(iii) the discontinued line finally crosses the 45-degree line at a lower point than the 
baseline simulation, hence a0SS reduces to a1SS. 
 One plausible conjecture for the change in the slopes of how at evolves is that a 
higher δI/δA lowers the threshold ability level which in turns leads to more entrepreneurs 
with less skill level undertaking innovation. When the domestic stock of knowledge is 
relatively low, the productivity of the innovative firms could be affected adversely so that 
at is decreasing in at-1. After reaching a certain distance to the frontier however, the 
opposite occurs and an increase in at is beneficial to the following period’s technological 
gap. The economic intuition lies in the fact that when the domestic technology stock is 
higher, the productivity of innovation is enhanced as seen from Eq. (6). 
 What then are the appropriate policies for moving closer to the world frontier the 
economy should implement in this scenario? Firstly, the government can opt to either 
promote B or H since in both cases, long run distance to frontier is improved. The final 
decision might depend on the marginal benefit each brings to growth which we have not 
modeled in this paper. Intuitively, compared to the country where firms only adopt 
technology, having more skilled workers plays an additional part in raising an economy’s 
relative productivity by facilitating home-grown innovation. In a similar vein, policies 
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that increase B boost the success rate of innovations resulting in convergence to a smaller 
technological gap from the frontier. 
 Secondly, from the analysis of δI/δA we can draw the conclusion that the optimal 
strategy for economies in an equilibrium which carries out both types of R&D activities 
is to maintain the relative monopoly power among the firms that innovates and firms that 
imitates.  
4.3.   Summary 
In economies that remain in the solely adoption trap, the government should intervene to 
increase the skilled labor force to move closer to the technology frontier whereas policies 
that boost B or δI/δA reap no benefit for the economy in the long run. However, if the 
economy wants to switch out of the adoption trap to carry out both adoption and 
innovation, it must implement steps to increase the skilled labor force or B sufficiently. 
Finally, in countries in which both imitation of leading-edge technologies and domestic 
innovation take place, increasing either B or H  leads to a higher steady state aSS. In 
contrast, doing the same for δI/δA is harmful to the economy’s final distance to frontier.  
5.   Conclusion 
This paper models the technology trajectory of an economy as it moves closer to the 
world frontier. Our discussion takes a fresh approach by including the entrepreneur who, 
consistent with the economic literature, is paramount in determining the R&D activities 
within an economy. In particular, we capture how countries transit from a technological 
paradigm exclusively or largely based on imitation of foreign technologies to one with an 
increasing percentage of domestic innovation. The interaction between the country’s 
stage of development and the upgrading of its R&D activities is portrayed through the 
profit-maximizing entrepreneur who has to surpass a threshold level of capability before 
the payoffs for undertaking innovation become more attractive than imitation. 
Furthermore, this entrepreneurial ability threshold is endogenized and found to be 
decreasing in the technological gap. This provides the fundamental basis for the changing 
technological structure as the country approaches the world frontier. 
Interestingly, the model predicts a unique distance to frontier equilibrium that 
countries converge to in the long run. In this final steady state, the economy consists of a 
mixture of firms that either imitate or innovate technology. However, it is also possible 
for a country to be trapped in a structure that only adopts from the frontier if the 
environment for firms to innovate is unfavorable. 
The theoretical framework sheds light to the developments in the world whereby 
technologically backward countries initially start off by imitating foreign ideas. Then, as 
the country builds up its own stock of knowledge and progresses towards the frontier, 
more and more innovative activities take place within the economy.  The existence of an 
adoption trap in our model also tallies with the observation that in the real world, very 
technologically backward countries conduct little or no innovative R&D. 
Future research could possibly incorporate endogenous human capital accumulation 
of the skilled workers and its subsequent effect on the productivity level of a country as 
  
 
 
well as modeling the cost for policy-makers to change the relevant parameters that affects 
the country’s steady state.  It also remains to test the hypothesis empirically, whether a 
country’s distance to frontier truly affects the share of imitation and innovation activities. 
Finally, we show that for a country to surmount the technological gap threshold and 
come out from the adoption trap, the government can intervene to enlarge the skilled 
workers base or implement measures that boost innovation. Policies that allow an 
economy to achieve a closer distance to frontier depend on whether the country is in a 
solely imitating steady state or one with both types of R&D activity. In the formal 
scenario, the strategy is straightforward: increase the skilled labor force. In the latter case, 
the optimal policy is to either enlarge B or H . Interestingly, we also find that inducing 
more innovation at the expense of adoption through higher monopoly rents may be 
detrimental to the country’s long run distance to frontier, especially when the country is 
technologically backward. 
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